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PROPERTY, W, EALTH, LA-D: ALLOCATION, PLANN ING AND DEvELOPMENT
(SELECTED CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF Rr-EAL PROPERTY:
AN INTRODUCTION). By Myres Smith McDougal and David Haber.
Charlottesville: Michie Casebook Corporation, 1948. Pp. viii, 1213. $9.50.
IT is gradually coming to be understood that the instrument of social
teleology par excellence is the planning agency, and that to ignore planning
is to overlook the purposive direction of social affairs. The time is long past
for arguments that direction is necessary: the theory that the sum of private
initiatives amounts to the general good has lain dead in intellectual gutters
for fifty years. A holistic theory gradually replaces laissez faire.
The law in the matter has never presented, enormous difficulty. Econo-
mists used to be annoyed about judges: they kne, no economics, it was said.
It can now be seen that this, to the extent to which it was true, may not
have been so unfortunate a circumstance as it might appear. Law: could not
shape itself about a theory no judge understood, or if he understood, ac-
cepted. So the law went on growing, gradually finding the meaning of
"general interest" and slowly finding ways for the implementation of the
general as against special interests. It was not always easy. Cases came to
the courts, as they always had; and the private interests which were en-
croaching on the general interest had good counsel. Also the judges fre-
quentiy had (or so it was said) sympathies and alliances which made social
protection difficult. Yet when they fell back on what was in their well-
instructed minds, they often found there a guidance toward the general as
against special interest.
In the United States the judges have not had overmuch opportunity to
interpret general interest statutes. The legislative process has been so
furiously dominated, these many years, by lobbyists for private advantage,
and by zeal to hamstring the executive, that institutions for the implemen-
tation of planning have had an extraordinarily difficult passage into life. It
was easiest with city planning, partly at least, because there the state legis-
lature was making law for another social organism than itself so planning
agencies could get into city charters when they had no chance at all of getting
established as instruments of the states themselves. But once they were
established, the courts cannot be said to have been unsympathetic to them.
There have often been misunderstandings but that is probably a result of the
way these things happen. Property law is as old as society; planning is a
sophisticated and recent process. Judges know, if they know anything, what
the accepted rules about property are; and there is no doubt that the con-
cept of planning seriously modifies them. What then could be more natural
than a certain resistance?
To the planning theorist the approach to planning by way of property law
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is to come in through a side door; and he has to look around for some time
before he knows where he is. But to a lawyer, it is the most natural thing in
the world to consider first of all the effect on property law of planning con-
cepts. Let us explore this a little further. The planner thinks first of a
gestalt, not of its parts, and certainly not of the individuals who are its
members. Rights? Rights to him would be claims to fair sharing in the
product thrown up by the organisms' various productive operations. Fair-
ness is only achieved in a concept of generality. It does not consist in such
a persistent protection of property that accumulations, which may not be
touched, threaten the principle of fairness.
It would have to be admitted, I suppose, that property rights have come
to enjoy a protection from the law which has often seriously limited what
could be done toward social improvement. Even in the most advanced city
charters, for instance, there is a requirement that changes in zoning regula-
tions (or other improvements) may be blocked by the objection of twenty
percent of the affected property owners; the gestalt of the city must conform
to the ideas of very small and very self-interested minorities. This illus-
tration is taken from what is probably the most advanced large-city charter
in the United States. And it must be noted that this and similar property
protections have held a general rezoning of New York City in abeyance for
some ten years, while real estate operators cash in on the present over-zoning
for commercial uses. But not much of this difficulty can be laid to the courts
or even, perhaps, to the law. Much more responsibility lies in the simple
failure of an integrated social organism to develop the' directive organs it
needs. When the New York charter was written, that twenty percent re-
quirement was pretty much taken out of the air. It might have been lowered
considerably if it had been realized how much of a handicap to the planning
of the city it would prove to be.
It is often said that it is difficult to get into the law protections for the
instruments of a positive policy. The law is for the protection of people from
each other and from the state; it is not to secure the smooth operations of the
social organism. Of course that is the way it has been. But that, again, is
because that was the notion of the way it should be. What is there to pre-
vent the growth of a different statutory attitude? And does anyone believe
that constitutional prohibitions will do more than temporarily hinder the
growth of a more positive policy? It is not any constitution or any body of
law which prevents such progress; it is our reluctance to become an active
and fairly-sharing partner in the general enterprise of society. Each of us
as individual or corporation hopes to exploit others; and we object to rules
which will prevent it. Those who cannot hope to gain from this kind of
arrangement (say, for instance, organized workers) are not instructed in
social theory. They do not know the betraying nature of common sense
approaches to social management. And more often than not their leaders
are rather politicians than intellectuals, so that they understand no better.
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The main effort of organized labor in our society sometimes seems to be to
get cut in on the loot rather than to create a situation in which productivity
is increased in the interests of the general welfare.
The result of these uncomprehending or mistaken policies is that those
who make the law-legislators, administrators and judges-are none of them
encouraged to shape it in favor of the social organism. And those who carry
out the law are often dedicated to the sabotage of the social organisms they
operate. Any one who doubts that this is true is referred respectfully to the
public papers of Mr. Herbert Hoover who was perhap.5 a great administrator
but who certainly felt that the government existed to further the interests
of Tom, Dick and Harry, confident that their prosperity added up to the
welfare of the whole. The debacle of 1929 was the direct result of trying to
operate a great society by not operating it as a whole. The amazement with
which the big business men saw the floods rise about their well-protected
thousand dollar desks showed how unconscious Americans were of the short-
comings of their social management.
They did not exactly learn from the crisis; but they began to give way at
the most obvious cracks. When it is admitted that the ill, the aged, and the
unemployed have right to at least a minimum protection, it is not a long
jump to the conclusion that the fewer there are the smaller will be the bill
for their support. And from that conclusion to the further one that only in
a high-energy, reciprocal organism can the power and continuity be found for
the maintenance of employment and welfare is not so far a jump either.
They are getting used to the idea, at least, that such possibilities exist.
With these matters in mind we are to examine the compendium of Pro-
fessors McDougal and Haber. It is intended, of course, not as a collection
of materials having to do with planning but as an introduction to the study
of property. But the consideration of what man can do with what he owns
unmistakably runs over into a marked emphasis on the fitting of what he
does with what he owns into the social gestalt. And so the casebook centers
not on individual but on social rights. It goes even further: it persistently
explores, in case after case, and in numerous descriptive and generalizing
articles (some orginally printed here and some not), the powers and abilities
of organisms to shape their ends. Property rights are treated as limitations
on these powers and abilities; how they stand today in theory and law is the
center of this whole exploration.
In fact the preface says: "The clients we envision for the prospective prop-
erty lawyer include not only the individual home-owner, business man, or
farmer, but also all the great and small, public and private, associations of
modem society, from, for example, local planning boards to the European
Recovery Administration or the World Bank or the United Nations." This
is a complete reversal of tradition. The lawyer is to be prepared, now, not
so much to find ways in which individuals may do what they like with their
own, as to find ways in which social organisms may proceed with their
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development in spite of any property rights which may stand in the way,
Such a reorientation would be expected to affect the structure of the com-
pendium; and it does. It frankly intends to sort out social functions (alloca-
tion, planning and development), to classify social organisms (metropolitan,
regional, national, world), and to use for its reference material those appellate
court opinions and those lay discussions which fit into the contexts of "cul-
ture, social structure and social crisis."
That all this is slightly revolutionary no lawyer will need to be told. And
those of us who function in related academic fields will not minimize the
importance of recognizing the simple fact that the social organism, the
"4general interest," is, at least in this time and place, the center of legal orien-
tation. Private interests and rights now group themselves humbly in the
shadow of the society in which they function. They are no longer the ar-
rogant determiners of what may and may not be done. It is a milestone,
this book, a recognition of distance come, of change accomplished. This is
literally meant; it is a recognition in the present, not an anticipation of the
future, and so it marks off how far we have actually come. The book will
have other editions as change goes on, presumably; and in some future one
of them it may be expected, for instance, that the index references to national
planning, which now number one, will gradually overtake and pass the num-
ber of references to city planning which are now 18. We actually have, and
know that we have, at least some city planning in this nation; we still pre-
tend that we have no national planning (although, of course, we bootleg a
good deal when the Congress is not looking). '
So the greater comes to comprehend the lesser: the community contains
its individuals and gives them the life and meaning they can no longer have
alone; it will gradually be recognized that the nation gives character to its
communities, as the forest does to its trees, even though each tree remains
an individual, and it will be recognized eventually that we are the nation we
began to be in 1787. Presumably, that lag must be overcome before we can
advance out of the nationalism which has already become technologically
obsolete before it has been perfected, and into the worldism which science
has prepared. World is a word which does not have an index heading now
in this compendium (although internationalism does). Nevertheless, there
is a kind of addendum, a chapter called, "Resource Planning and Develop-
ment in the World Community," which is one of the book's best 2; no one
could read this chapter, really, without understanding that the tangle of
difficulties incident to the practices of nationalism require wider jurisdictions
1. Incidentally, the one reference to national planning has a sub-head; it reads, "exist-
ing chaos." It should be noted however that a good deal of national planning finds its way
into this book, as it finds its way into our government, under such various guises as Taylor
Grazing Act, Water Power, Housing, Forest Service, Farm Tenancy, Eminent Domain,
etc., and that the same is true of International Planning.




for their solution. These may be regional before they become world institu-
tions; but logical stopping places short of global finitude are hard to find
these days and becoming harder all the time.
We have come to the point of suggesting, in this review at least, that what
may be done on an Iowa farm, in a Birmingham steel mill, in a Northwest
forest, or a New York office, is not only the separate action of a farmer, a
businessman, a worker, an engineer, or of a corporation projecting the
cooperating personalities of any group of them, but is part of a locked series
of actions all of which interpenetrate each other, and that the extension of
this solidarity, this unity, this interpenetration, until the world itself becomes
logically one indivisible, almost organic, whole, is already prepared for in
technology. Such a society, once it takes on organization, will not be too
long delayed in beginning to develop the specialized organs it will need for
direction. At that time the impersonal, imponderable motion of cultural
evolution will come gradually under some kind of control. And men's prop-
erties will have something like the relation to it which cells have to individ-
ual bodies of which they are part: they will function within the union of a
cooperating whole, with the good of the whole as their objective. They will
not expect, each of them, to be permitted to exploit the others, or even to
function with complete independence.
This is a long way forward from the fundaments of capitalism. To what
extent it will, when it arrives, modify the freedom of economic enterprise,
cannot be told in advance. The rule will be that freedom must not be al-
lowed to derange the whole. Desirable as freedom is for securing initiative-
and initiative must always be an important consideration-it cannot be per-
mitted to disrupt the pattern agreed on for the general economy. But cap-
italism has always been supposed to rest on a liberty which welcomed com-
petition and conflict. The theory wi-as that freely conflicting enterprisers
(who are property users) would reach compromises approximating the
public good. This made no allowance for the general definition of objectives
or for shaping enterprise toward their attainment. That this was always-
and latterly conspicuously so-more theory than reality everyone knows.
What is not so often realized, however, is that the orthodoxy of the theory,
the prevalent unwillingness to reject it, always made betraying appeal to it
possible. And there has therefore been very uneven conformance to the
rule. One of the marks of latter day capitalism has been the differentiation
between those individuals and corporations whose behavior was required to
conform to the rule (or who did so voluntarily) and those who were able to
evade it. Eyasion in the early "trust" days was easy. Fair trade practices
were, however, gradually defined and regulations came gradually to have a
semblance of enforcement. Evasion then passed into a more esoteric if not
a more ethical phase. Competition need not be a reality if competitors do
not compete; and there has never been any way discovered of enforcing com-
petition. Those who tried to enforce it-and there were earnest trials-ought
814 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol,58
to have seen that it was self defeating. Either competition is free or it is not
competition. Compulsion is an injection of social rule whose logical end is
the acceptance of responsibility for the function regulated. Between public
ownership and regulation there is only a tenuous distinction to be made. It
is a taking of property to limit what may be done with it. And if this limita-
tion checks profit-making and power-gaining, where then is freedom?
And whence can come the right of the public to interfere? It must be done
with some idea that the public (that is, the social organism within which the
organs regulated function) has superior power-that sovereignty is not
lodged in the automatism of freedom but rather in the directive organ of the
public--somewhere within the government. If this is so, the extent of inter-
ference is theoretically immaterial. It is no more a denial of freedom to take
away all right to function than it is to take away some of that right. It may
be more "unreasonable"-a word well-liked by courts-but when so un-
definable a test as reasonableness is allowed, the whole matter has become
one of expediency rather than of fundamental attitude. There may be a
contest-say between courts and legislatures-as to how actual limitation
is to be applied, but there can no longer be an appeal to freedom and to in-
herent right.
It was always true that freedom could not be unlimited if only because of
the inherent conflicts of freedom-using persons or corporate bodies. They
might, of course, limit each other without interference by the public in the
interest of a general good. But in practice that kind of freedom results in
using the public as a football to be kicked about among contestants and
leaves it in the end at the mercy of exploitative forces which become in-
tolerable. Rather than modify the theory of laissezfaire, which was neither
derived from original facts nor supported by any subsequent ones, the line
taken by theorists and jurists has usually been to maintain the theory as a
fiction, with tacit agreement to modify it in such ways as would make the
practical situation tolerable. The difficulty with this is the familiar one of
rule by men rather than by law-or by agreed precept. And even if the man
is a judge, his rule of reason may not be another's, even another judge's.
It is not as though there were not another approach, another conception.
To regard the society, the economy, the community, the social organism,
as a cohesive whole, does yield greater objectivity because functions, organs,
cells can be brought into relation with each other and can be tested by the
contribution they make to the whole. It is easier to say that the steel in-
dustry, with a theoretical capacity of, say, 100,000,000 tons of production
ought to produce it when the nation needs it, than it is to say that it ought
to be allowed to profit to the extent of eight percent on a putative valuation
of a billion dollars. Differences about tons of steel are likely to be much
fewer than they are about valuations for rate (or profit) making. In the one
case there is a defensible, even an objective, criterion for performance; in
the other there literally is none.
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If Professors McDougal and Haber have not gone over to a holistic con-
ception of the society within which properties are used, they have at least
not based themselves on laissezfaire. They might not like to admit that they
have made any commitment at all. But what, then, does it mean to ask,
as they do:
"What are the resources, natural and technological, of the
United States today and what are their potentialities for the pro-
duction of values? What values do the people of the United States
demand today from their resources and institutions and by what
procedures can these values be translated into concrete programs
of action and specific objectives toward which property doctrines
and practices may be directed? What are the conditions and prob-
able trends-in the demands, identifications, and expectations of
the people; in resources and technology and the degree and ef-
ficiency of their use; in the structure of private claim and com-
munity control; in the balance of world power; etc.-which will
largely determine the extent to which such values can be achieved?
What, specifically, are the probable effects of thenew uses of atomic
energy? How, under such conditions, can the nation bring its
best enlightenment and skills to the task of creating and operating
the institutions appropriate for optimum achievement of all its
values? How can it establish and perfect procedures in all its
communities, efficiently and subject to democratic controls, to
perform the necessary and continuous tasks of intelligence--the
clarification and reclarification of goal, the appraisal and reap-
praisal of conditions, and the inventive consideration of alterna-
tive means? How can the people of the nation be brought to that
consciousness of their interdependencies, that understanding of
the necessity for the use of enlightenment and skill, and the vision
of the rich promise of appropriate action which will cause them to
assume the necessary initiative? How, in sum, can the large-
scale property transformations which impend be managed not
only with a minimum of destructiveness but even with a maximum
production of values?" 3
The series of questions is sought to be answered in the 1200 pages which
follow. At the risk of generalizing perhaps too freely, it can be said that the
answers, with such relevance as they possess, present themselves in the
comments of economists, political scientists, and legal theorists; they are
not to be found in the cited opinions. This is not then so much a casebook
as a book of commentary. It could not be a casebook because judges do not
ordinarily commit themselves to holistic theory. They rest on specific ac-
ceptances or rejections of pleadings which come before them. They will dis-
cuss privilege, right, concern, benefit, burden, and even equity or justice.
But these must usually be surrounded by multitudinous fact and supported
by a firm foundation of precedent (which is often called principle). This is
3. P.3.
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quite a different procedure from that to be found in the essay on property
by W. H. Hamilton and Irene Till 4 for instance, or that on Public Owner-
ship as an Instrument of Planning and Development Policies,' both of which
have implications which must be fairly hair-raising to lawyers who prefer
to stay close to "practicality."
The book has four parts. The first (in some hundred pages) is titled
Property and Wealth and is devoted to consideration of private volition and
community control, federal and state, in the use and development of re-
sources. The second is titled Land (Resource) Allocation by Private Voli-
tion; it contains four chapters of three hundred pages. It runs from the
establishment of claims-volition, recording, adverse possession and basic
reifications: title, fee simple, ownership, possession, land-through dead-
hand volition-trusts, future interests and possessory estates, and landlord
and tenant (caveat consumer) to concurrent interests (anachronism red-
ivivus). Part three, to which the others are more or less introductory, con-
cerns land planning and development and runs to seven chapters of some
eight hundred pages. Here it is that Messrs. McDougal and Haber have
gathered together what is known about what may be done by the com-
munity (city, state, nation) to shape its future-that is, to what extent pri-
vate interests and rights limit what wouldothenvise seem desirable to do.
There is perhaps a small confusion about what constitutes planning as
distinct from control in the interest of a plan or the execution of one. And
the concentration on land excludes the temporal dimension of planning
which is so important to the planner but does not directly involve property
rights. But these exceptions aside, the gathering-together is satisfactorily
comprehensive.
It is not a picture of adequate progress, whether what is paid attention to
is the quotation from the National Resources Board Report (Our Cities:
Their Role in the National Economy) which is headed "Patterns of Anarchy,"
or the note which the editors append after citing several "nuisance cases."
"It may bear emphasis that in these 'nuisance' cases the courts,
however conscious or unconscious of their function, are in fact
planning and determining the actual land use patterns of their
communities and that in most of our communities this is the only
kind of planning for which the community institutions make provi-
sion. The student will wish to observe not only the utter physical
chaos of our contemporary communities, the interdependence in
terms of effects on private and community values of all uses of
land, and the octrines which are supposed to guide the courts in
their retrospective, retroactive planning but also the whole insti-
tutional context in which this planning takes place, and to question
its adequacy to secure commonly accepted community objectives.





that they decide only as between the two parties and between them
only so long as there is no substantial change in conditions, that
they do not have the staffs or technical aids necessary to efficient
and continuous performance of planning functions, and that the
only technical standards at their command are the elusive tort
doctrines." 6
But how could it be otherwise? A community which establishes a planning
agency must do so from practical compulsion, simply because there seems
to be no other way to solve numerous problems and to achieve the coordina-
tion for lack of which nothing is done efficiently. There has been no pre-
vious preparation such as makes other institutions orthodox and ordinary.
And it is often true, incredible as it seems, that judges who substitute them-
selves for planning agencies do so without any of the uneasiness or reticence
which might be expected from the fact that they do not have "staffs or
technical aids necessary to efficient and continuous performance of planning
functions." Hit-and-run settlement of issues with far and deep implications
is often undertaken with incredible lightheartedness.
This book will without doubt contribute to a change in attitude. But it
cannot be taken as a phenomenon by itself. It is one which belongs to the
culture of a society which is in process of discovering that it has entity and
continuity, and that it is not made up of discrete autonomous associations,
but is a functioning, complex, interrelated whole. This book is itself an
evidence that these processes of discovery are in operation.
One who examines the industrial institutions of our society must be struck
at once by their organic self-consciousness mid by the highly developed
character of the organs for direction which hold the entire organism to a
purposive and consistent course. In fact planners find their techniques
developing most rapidly in industry. This movement was first made articu-
late by Frederick W. Taylor; but he was followed by numerous others; and
there was even a Society in the early decades of this century for scientific
management, whose work merged gradually into the every day practice of
industrial engineers.
There has been a city planning movement too. But it has proceeded vith-
out this kind of encouragement and has by no means become diffused into
the same general acceptance as has planning in industry. This is partly
because planning interferes with legislative and executive functions when
they are carried on by whim or caprice or even with a view to immediate
"political" ends. The planning agency has a way of making much clear and
objective which was before conveniently hazy and so could be manipulated
on specious grounds; and planning is therefore inconvenient to whimsical
mayors or log-rolling councilmen. As a result, even when it has had to be
accepted at the insistence of groups of better citizens, it has usually been so
mutilated in being born as to be a discredit to the whole planning species.
6. P. 439.
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And as for national planning, the "politics" of the usual city hall is not
much different from that of Capitol Hill. The Congress bitterly resists the
intrusion of objectivity and of consistency when those virtues might inter-
fere with the furthering of the local interests which are, after all, really
represented by Congressmen. Even such leadership in the direction of con-
sistency and general interest as comes from the other end of Pennsylvania
Avenue is furiously resented. We are far from the acceptance by politicans
of any institution for creating and furthering the social virtues to which there
is so much objection even in the embryonic stages.
Yet here we have a book which looks to public rights and welfare, which
anticipates that Lawyers' clients in the future will include social organisms,
which expects planning institutions to have a formidable development within
a foreseeable future. It must constitute recognition of a movement under
way as well as a portent of new things to come. The politicians, if they can-
not be convinced, will have to be coerced by constitution-making. That may
be a longer process than even Messrs. McDougal and Haber would seem to
anticipate.
REXFORD G. TUGWELLt
No PLACE TO HmE. By David Bradley. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1948, Pp. xviii, 182.
DURING the present hectic phase of mounting international tension,
popular books about the atomic bomb are likely to have political repercus-
sions that are by no means inconsequential. In assessing any such book, it
is not sufficient merely to examine the intrinsic worth of the information it
contains. Of far greater social importance is the way in which the A-bomb
is presented, the predictions, prognostications, warnings, reassurances, and
admonitions which, by being brought to the focus of attention, are poten-
tially capable of molding public opinion.
Careful consideration of the attitudes and expectations conveyed to the
audience is especially relevant in the case of a widely publicized essay like
Bradley's No Place to Hide. As may be inferred from its repeated appearance
on the New York Times best-seller list, this book has reached that relatively
large and influential sector of the American public which comprises those
who promptly peruse the latest non-fiction offerings on contemporary issues.
What sort of a contribution does Bradley make to public enlightenment
on the critical problems raised by the destructive use of atomic energy? A
purported answer to this question appears on the dust jacket, reiterating
the extensive advertisements about the book: "What the atomic bomb can
do to ships, or water, or land, and thereby to human beings, is told with
t Division of Social Sciences; University of Chicago.
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clear implictions for all of us by a brilliant young doctor whose job it was
to watch for radioactive contamination during and after the Bikini tests."
Many readers may be somewhat disappointed to find that most of the
contents consist of a detailed log of the author's day to day experiences
during Operation Crossroads. As a plodding, prosaic record of the activi-
ties of a radiological monitor, it is perhaps successful in conveying the un-
glamorous monotony and routine which characterized the life of scientific
observers who were present at the Bikini tests. Only infrequently is the
account enlivened by a brief depiction of the personal reactions of the par-
ticipants in those "hastily planned and hastily carried out" experiments.
Here and there we catch a glimpse of the discomfort and consternation of
research scientists who are forced to make practical decisions affecting the
lives of large numbers of persons, before adequate data on the effectiveness
of alternative precautionary measures are available. On a few pages we are
treated to a vivid portrayal of the befuddlement of Navy regulars who find
their habitual activities "fouled up" by "geigers," that new, unseen and
hardly credible, menace: "decks you can't stay on for more than a few
minutes but which seem like other decks; air you can't breathe without gas
masks but which smells like all other air; water you can't swim in, and good
tuna and jacks you can't eat."
WNrhere in the book do we find the "clear implications for all of us" which
we are promised by the blurb on the dust jacket? Presumably in the oc-
casional comments, interspersed throughout the later sections of the log,
on the destructive impact of the A-bomb. Dr. Bradley correctly calls at-
tention to the fact that the nationwide publicity on the Bikini tests, with
its emphasis on the unexpectedly small number of ships sunk, has had the
effect of minimizing the threat of indiscriminate use of atomic energy for
political coercion; it has contributed, therefore, to the widespread indiffer-
ence about the A-bomb which characterizes American public opinion at the
present time. This error in publicity he attempts to correct by emphasizing
certain of the findings, which have been played down in official releases, on
persistent radiological effects produced by the underwater A-bomb ex-
plosion.
The spray from the water-bursting bomb, we are told, left a radioactive
coating on the surviving ships, a coating which transformed the decks into
uninhabitable death traps. Short of sandblasting or dousing all exposed
surfaces with acid, the lethal radioactivity persists for months and perhaps
for years. The author does not neglect to point out that the surfaces of side-
walks, streets and buildings in our metropolitan seaports are no less vulner-
able than the surfaces of the abandoned fleet: "I can think of no fact demon-
strated by the Bikini tests which is more important in its widest implications
than this difficulty of ridding the habitable surfaces of our world of contam-
inating fission products." Dr. Bradley completes his description of lingering
radioactivity with a speculative account of the various ways that fatal doses
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can be spread-via fish, floating slicks, and so on-to become -a menace to
inhabitants of coastal areas far removed from an underwater atomic ex-
plosion.
There need be no doubt about the fact that the limited portions of the
book dealing with radiological contamination serve to correct some of the
misinformation and false impressions left by the news releases and editorials
on the results of the Bikini tests. But Dr. Bradley apparently assumes that
by playing up the lethal dangers of A-bomb explosions, as he has done, it is
possible to counteract public indifference about the vital political issues
posed by those dangers. This assumption is seriously open to question on the
basis of the findings of recent attitude and opinion research.
Although the results cannot be taken at face value, the available evidence
from cross-section surveys of the U. S. population indicates that the majority
of Americans are already keenly aware of the enormously destructive conse-
quences of A-bomb warfare. The widespread public indifference revealed
by the surveys evidently cannot be attributed to a lack of appreciation of
the magnitude of the A-bomb threat. On the contrary, there are some good
reasons for suspecting that the current attitudes of the American public are,
to some extent, an unintended psychological effect of the early post-war
publicity about the bomb, long before the Bikini tests, which aroused anxiety
by repeatedly stressing the ominous dangers to be anticipated without of-
fering aiiy convincing information about ways and means of averting the
threat. The tendency to ward off anxiety-by ignoring the A-bomb threat
as much as possible, by relegating it to the dim, unforseeable future, or by
wishful thinking about national or personal invulnerability-is probably an
important motivation underlying the public indifference about which Dr.
Bradley is so concerned.
If this is so, a constructive awakening of public opinion can hardly be
expected from a book which does nothing more than to call attention to
certain of the dangers produced by atomic bomb explosions. If we avoid
thinking about a potential source of danger it is usually because we know of
no way of protecting ourselves, nothing we can actually do or think about
doing that will serve to reduce the anxiety we experience whenever we per-
mit ourselves to pay attention to the threat and to take it seriously. Our
attitude of defensive indifference is more likely to be reinforced than counter-
acted by a communication which arouses our anticipatory anxieties once
again, without pointing to concrete social actions that can be taken to cir-
cumvent the dangers.
It is true that Dr. Bradley has given an honest, objective description of
the radiological dangers he has observed. Like the atomic scientists who
have made so many public statements about the A-bomb threat, he can feel
with some justification that his task is merely to point out the dangers and
that it is up to others to work out constructive, reassurant solutions to
channelize the anxieties that are aroused. But the actual effect on the public
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may be far from what is intended so long as mass communications continue
to present an image of the atomic bomb as a terrible menace from which
there is no place to hide.
IRVING L. JAust
SELECT CASES MN THE EXCHEQUER CHA31BER BEFORE ALL THE JUSTIcES OF
EN-GL.aD. Volume II, 1461-1509. Edited for the Selden Society by M.
Hemmant. London: Bernard Quaritch. 1948. Pp. li, 212.
By the fifteenth century the assembly of the justices in the Exchequer
Chamber had come to be recognized as the proper place for the resolution
of doubts and difficult questions of law. To it the common law judges as
well as the chancellor adjourned troublesome cases, and there, before the
justices of both benches, they were discussed and considered. Though the
Exchequer Chamber was without authority and its decisions purely advisory,
results reached in such an assembly of legal talent were not apt to be dis-
regarded when matters were returned to the courts from whence they had
come.
Since the cases referred to the Exchequer Chamber were important and
its prestige great, its deliberations and discussions were carefully reported.
From four manuscript volumes of fifteenth century reports Miss Hemmant
has transcribed fifty cases heard during the reigns of Edward IV, Richard
III, and Henry VII. Forty-three of these had already appeared, in one form
or another, in the folio Year Books, and Miss Hemmant has collated her
manuscript reports both with these and with the abstracts printed in Fitz-
herbert's and Brooke's Abridgerents. The Selden Society's plan undoubtedly
was to make available versions as complete as possible of an important group
of fifteenth century cases, among them some very useful to the legal and con-
stitutional historian, but it has not been particularly fortunate in its editor.
Miss Hemmant clearly is neither a lawyer nor at home among medieval law
reports. Consequently nany of the nice points of law and procedure that
so interested counsel and judges, as well as some of the obvious ones, have
escaped her. When the reporter notes that the king was 'displeased per le
long jour' he means simply that the adjournment a week hence did not meet
with his approval. To infer from this (p. xliv) that the king perhaps sat on
the bench and was bored by a long and dreary day in court is, of course, an
inference no lawyer would make. That editors not sufficiently familiar with
their materials must needs be employed if the work is to be done at all is
only another indication of the deplorable lack of attention devoted to legal
historical studies in both England and the United States. Here as elsewhere
the profession gets no more than it deserves, nor must it be outraged to find
the correcting pencil necessary.
'I Department of Psychology; Yale University.
19491 REVIEWS
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A reviewer inevitably must be of two minds about a list of errors. Hous-
man-like irascibility or self-aggrandizement too often is the real explanation
behind it. Then, too, even a short catalogue tends to overshadow the large
portions of text and translation that need no correction. With misgivings,
therefore, I print the list below. It makes no claim to completeness nor will
the learned reader find it useful, for Miss Hemmant's texts usually are good
or easily emended. Where there are doubts the folio edition of the Year
Books may be consulted. But to those now first coming to legal history,
whose concern is with the right rather than the left side of the page, they
may be of value, if only to indicate that fifteenth century lawyers did not
lapse into nonsense nor reporters into incomprehensibility. P. 1: for the
editor's addition 'mes' read 'ou'; p. 5: for 'derror' read 'dereigne' and omit
the editorial addition 'bref'; p. 6: a negative apparently has been omitted
in the sentence 'et ce fuit le plus fort consideracion que le priour [ne] serroit
conclud', nor is the sentence adequately translated by 'and it was the opinion
that the prior should be concluded'; (case 3): 'reservaunt rent et tin entre
pur defaute' in Littleton's speech is simply 'reserving rent and an entry for
default', but the passages directly preceding and following it are corrupt and
the translation largely meaningless; p. 7: read 'a wife by agreement of her
husband can receive advantage, such as feoffment or lease for term of years,
but never disadvantage'; p. 8: read 'and the rent was again in arrear, now
he must have the action in both their names etc.'; p. 11: 'autrefoitz' is, of
course, 'again'; p. 13: for 'tamen' read 'tantum': 'where one is expelled only
it was said to be a change etc. although another was not put in his place';
p. 15: for 'no law etc.' read 'null tiel tenaunt'; p. 38: 'profitt que nest man-
ualle' is one that lies in grant rather than livery; p. 53: the word 'void' has
been omitted in Fairfax's speech; p. 61: for 'destre' in the phrase 'mesme le
chose que est destre principallement' read 'delyvere'; p. 62: the translation
should read: 'and he cannot recover damages and also the goods for which
he recovers damages'; omit the editor's inserted 'ne'; read 'seeing that the
declaration was good and acceptable in law, counting generally of damages';
p. 83: 'breve de decepcione' is a writ of deceit; p. 102: the translation should
read: 'And because the grant of the aforesaid tenth had been granted by the
clergy of the province of Canterbury and the exemption is in these words, to
excuse from the collection of tenths granted by the clergy of England, the
question was whether the answer was sufficient or not.'; p. 103: 'clerus' has
been made into 'clericus' with impossible results: the translation should
read: 'But if it were possible or in some way had before been the custom that
the clergy of England should grant or had granted any tenth to the king,
then the exemption would be valueless [here], because the intention of the
king is understood to be that the abbot should only be excused touching
such grant etc., [but] seeing that no such grant can be made by the whole of
the clergy of England, to wit, by those two provinces, but only by one in
particular, and either of the same provinces is the clergy of England . . .
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so either clergy is the clergy of England.'; p. 104: 'The nomination might
thus be special which the king cannot pardon etc.'; p. 116: 'for the words
are that the inhabitants of that place shall not be vexed or sued ...and
not that one may be there against the dignity of the king'; pp. 118-19:
'waifs and strays . . .chattels of outlawed felons etc.'; p. 128: Miss Hem-
mant seems here to be unfamiliar with the tenancy by the law of England; p.
129: 'The question was whether this writ be sufficient warrant for the heirs
of the mother [Margaret] wife of John Higford etc.': n. 2 therefore is wrong;
the commission to which n. 1 refers should be sought on the Patent Roll;
that granted to Lord Dacres is in Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VII, x485-94, p. 165;
pp. 129-30: the translation should read: 'by this writ of diem clausit e.x-
tremum after the death of the tenant by the law of England, when it is
found that the reversion of the manor after the death of the mother de-
scended to the heir of the mother, that is sufficient for the heir to have
livery, because there is seen [?'visum' for 'unus'], in effect, tenure of the king,
a tenant per legem Anglie, and a reversion etc. And it is [not] always nec-
essary to make mention of the estate of the wife when such an office is taken
after the death of a tenant per legem Anglie'; p. 131 (case 40): for 'accorde'
read 'accordaunt'; p. 132: for 'apres' read 'per'; the translation should read:
'and he prayed the lands to farm by the statute'; the statute is 36 Edw. III,
st. 1, ca. 13; p. 133: to make sense of Keble's speech the translation must
read: 'monstrans de droit is when the king is entitled by matter of fact which
is true, but nevertheless the party has droit'; p. 135 (case 42): 'a autre entent'
begins a new sentence; the word 'differently' is a mistranslation; p. 136:
'in iure ecclesie' clearly is not 'by ecclesiastical law'; p. 139: the word 'dou-
ble' interlined was inserted by some one a good deal closer to and more
familiar with the law of Henry VII's reign than Miss Hemmant can claim to
be. It has been omitted in the translation with disastrous results. The last
paragraph should read: 'And it was said that if the king be entitled by double
matter of record to have the land etc., as by attainder [etc.], the party shall
not have traverse but shall sue by petition, and the reason for this is because
the king's first title is not disproved if the attainder [is annulled], and be-
cause it [the first title] remains in force the party shall not traverse it etc.';
p. 157: the word 'droit'.is omitted in Jaye's speech: 'le baille est un que ad
droit a medler'; p. 158: 'Quod nota. Iudicium.'; p. 166: the statute in Mor-
daunt's speech is Quia emptores; p. 167: the statute in Boteler's speech is
Westminster II, ca. 16: 'then that lord who first recovers shall have the ward-
ship of the body, and this is in accordance with the statute'; the statute
referred to in the next line, however, is 4 Hen. VII, ca. 17; p. 168: 'per certein
temps' is 'for a certain time'; p. 169: the statutes are 36 Edv. III, st. 1, ca.
13; 8 Hen. VI, ca. 16; 18 Hen. VI, ca. 6; 'au maignez' is 'at least' not 'medi-
ately'; p. 171: the translation of the first part of Rede's speech is nonsense;
it should read: 'there are many statutes which give actions popular, such as
decies tantum and other like actions'; p. 174: in the translation omit 'in this
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